To be able to believe that a dog with a broken paw is not really in pain when it whimpers is a quite extraordinary achievement even for a philo- 
'soul' (I shall come back to this); but this is a separate point. To deny that X has a soul is a separate claim from the claim that X's movements can be explained by mechanical principles, and is not strictly entailed by it. Proposition (2) is implied frequently by Descartes, and is stated explicitly in a letter to More of 5 February 1649: it seems reasonable since art copies nature, and men can make various automata which move without thought, that nature should produce its own automata much more splendid than the artificial ones. These natural automata are the animals.9
It is Descartes' use of the term 'automaton' more than any other that has led critics to convict him of holding the monstrous thesis (thus, Kemp Smith speaks of the Cartesian view that animals are 'mere automata ... incapable of experiencing the feelings of well-being or the reverse, hunger or thirst ... ').10 But the inference from 'x is an automaton' to 'X is incapable of feeling' is a mistaken one. Webster's dictionary gives the primary meaning of 'automaton' as simply 'a machine that is relatively self-operating'; and neither this nor the subsidiary meaning ('creature who acts in a mechanical fashion') automatically implies the absence of feeling.11 Even today, then, to regard total insensibility as part of the meaning of 'automaton' would seem to be an error; and this seems to have been even more true in the seventeenth century, where 'automaton' probably carried no more than its strict Greek meaning of 'selfmoving thing'. Thus Leibniz, defending his claim that we possess 'freedom of spontaneity' speaks of the human soul as 'a kind of spiritual automaton', meaning no more than that its action-generating impulses arise solely ab interno, and produce their effects without the intervention of any external cause.12 What fascinated Descartes' generation about machines ranging from clocks to the elaborately contrived moving statues to be found in some of the royal fountains was simply this: the complex sequences of movements which to primitive (or medieval) man might have appeared as certain proof of some kind of inner motive 'force' or 'spirit', could all be explained quite simply by reference to internal mechanical structurecogs, levers and the like (Descartes mentions as an example a statue of 9 'deinde quia rationi consentaneum videtur, cum ars sit naturae imitatrix, possintque homines varia fabricare automata, in quibus sine ulla cogitatione est motus, ut natura etiam sua automata, sed artefactis longe praestantiora, nempe bruta omnia, producat' (AT V 277; K 244.) This is a development of material found in Discourse, part V (loc. cit. 12 Theodicy, I, 52.
Neptune which would threaten with his trident the approaching onlooker who had unwittingly stepped on a button).13 The point Descartes is concerned to make over and over again about the behaviour of 'natural automata' like dogs and monkeys is that the mere complexity of their movements is no more a bar to explanation in terms of inner mechanical structure than is the case with the responses of the trident-brandishing 'Neptune'.14 III So far then, I maintain that Descartes' characterization of animals as 'machines' and 'automata' is of itself quite insufficient to allow us to conclude that he thinks that animals lack feelings. When we get on to the remaining propositions in our list, things are not so simple. It is, Descartes asserts, in principle possible to mistake a cleverly contrived artificial automaton for an animal. But we could never mistake an automaton, however ingenious, for a man. Why not? Because, says Descartes, an automaton could never talk: it could 'never arrange its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that could be said in its presence'.15 This for Descartes indicates the crucial difference between animals and man-they do not think. Animals do not penser or cogitare; they are not endowed with a mind (mens, esprit); they lack reason (raison); they do not have a rational soul (dme raisonnable).16
Descartes is thus explicitly committed to thesis (3), and holds, moreover, that it is entailed by (or at least strongly evidenced by17) thesis (4). Descartes was of course aware that parrots can be made to 'talk' and that dogs make noises which might be analogous to speech; but he has strong and, since Chomsky's updating of them, widely admired arguments against construing such utterances as genuine speech. The talking of parrots is dismissed because it is not 'relevant to the topic';18 but the most important point Descartes has to make is that the utterances of dogs, cats, etc., are never, to use the Chomskian phrase, 'stimulus-free'; they are always, says Descartes, geared to and elicited by a particular 'natural impulse'.19 I shall come back to these arguments, but first an obvious objection must be faced. In admitting that Descartes held thesis (3) (that animals do not think), have I not thereby conceded that he must have held the 'monstrous thesis' (7) (that animals do not feel)? For does not Descartes' special sense of 'think' (cogitare, penser) include feelings and sensations? Well, it is certainly true that Descartes deliberately extended the normal use of 'cogitatio' or 'pensee'. In answer to a misunderstanding of Mersenne (that if man was purely 'res cogitans' he must lack will), Descartes stated that willing was a fafon de penser; he further explains that la pensee includes 'non seulement les meditations et les volontes' but 'toutes les operations de l'dme'.20 This is generally taken to include sensations and feelings-indeed, seeing and hearing are explicitly included by Descartes in the list of 'operations de l'ame' just mentioned.
Further analysis however makes it clear that the matter is not as straightforward as this, and that translators who render 'cogitatio' or 'pensee' as simply 'experience' are moving much too swiftly.21 When discussing whether 'video ergo sum' might not do as well as 'cogito ergo sum', Descartes says that 'I see' is ambiguous. If understood 'de visione' it is not a good premise for inferring one's existence but if understood 'concerning the actual sense or awareness of seeing' (de ipso sensu sive conscientia videndi) it is quite certain, since it is in this case referred to the mind which alone feels or thinks it sees (quae sola sentit sive cogitat se videre).22 From this we can see that it is misleading to say, tout court, that cogitatio 'includes' sensations and feelings. The only sense in which a sensation like seeing is a true cogitatio is the sense in which it may involve the reflective mental awareness which Descartes calls conscientia-the self-conscious apprehension of the mind that it is aware of seeing.23
The upshot is that Descartes' assertion of proposition (3) Notice, moreover, how the language argument fits into all this. In pointing out that animals have no genuine language, Descartes clearly thinks that he has a powerful case for concluding that they do not think. Yet for Descartes to regard this argument ('non loquitur ergo non cogitat')24 as having such evident force, 'think' (cogitat) here must evidently be used in the fairly restrictive sense described above. If Descartes were using 'cogitat' in the alleged very wide sense, he would be offering us an argument of the form 'non loquitur ergo non sentit' (he does not speak therefore does not feel). It is inconceivable that Descartes could have proudly produced this argument to his correspondents as self-evidently clinching.
IV
Our conclusion so far is that neither in calling animals machines or automata, nor in denying they have thought or language, does Descartes commit himself to the monstrous thesis that they have no feelings or sensations. It is now time to look at some positive evidence that he actually regarded the monstrous thesis as false.
The strongest evidence, which those who credit Descartes with the monstrous thesis seem strangely blind to, comes from the famous letters already cited where Descartes denies speech to the animals. Writing to More, Descartes says that the sounds made by horses, dogs, etc., are not genuine language, but are ways of 'communicating to us ... their natural impulses of anger, fear, hunger and so on'.25 Similarly, Descartes wrote to Newcastle that:
If you teach a magpie to say good-day to its mistress when it sees her coming, all you can possibly have done is to make the emitting of this word the expression of one of its feelings. For instance it will be an expression of the hope of eating, if you have habitually given it a titbit when it says the word. Similarly, all the things which dogs, horses, and monkeys are made to do are merely expressions of their fear, 
V
The last quotation might make a pleasing and neat vindication of Descartes' kindly fellowship with the beasts: he denied that animals think, but not that they feel. But philosophy is seldom as tidy as this, and we must conclude by discussing a major difficulty which has been put off until now. The difficulty, in a nutshell, is that the monstrous thesis fits in with, and the pleasing vindication clashes with, Descartes' dualism.
If substance is divided exclusively and exhaustively into res cogitans and res extensa, what room is there for animal sensations? Since an animal is not a res cogitans, has no mind or soul, it follows that it must belong wholly in the extended divisible world of jostling Cartesian shapes. And this means that what we call (and, evidemment, Descartes himself called) 'animal hunger' cannot be anything more than a set of internal muscle contractions leading to the jerking of certain limbs, or whatever. This then must be the authentic Cartesian position-a position summed up when Descartes quotes with approval the passage in Deuteronomy which says that the soul of animals is simply their blood; or when he says that animal life is no more than 'the heat of the heart'.28
No doubt this is where a pure Cartesian, a consistent Cartesian, would stop. But we have seen that Descartes, dualist or no, undoubtedly and explicitly attributes such feelings as anger, hope and joy to animals. I think the only explanation of this is that Descartes, either inadvertently or wilfully, failed to eradicate a certain fuzziness from his thinking about consciousness and self-consciousness. To say that X is in pain (angry, joyful) is certainly to attribute a conscious state to X; but this need not amount to the full-blooded reflective awareness of pain that is involved in the term cogitatio. To be dogmatic for a moment, I should certainly say that cats feel pain, but not that they have the kind of full mental awareness of pain that is needed for it to count as a cogitatio (i.e. the sort needed to support the premise of a cogito-type argument 'patior ergo sum'-'I am in pain therefore I am'). Descartes is certainly committed to thesis (5)-that animals do not have self-consciousness; but when as a result he consigns animals to the realm of res extensa, he simply does not seem to bother that terms like pain, anger, etc., which he uses of animals, clearly imply some degree of conscious (though perhaps not 'self-conscious') awareness.
VI
It is important to notice, in conclusion, that this strange fuzziness is not simply the result of a blind spot which Descartes had when dealing with animals, but connects with a fundamental and unresolved difficulty in Cartesian metaphysics. There is a fascinating chapter in Book IV of the Principles dealing with human sensations (sensus) and feelings (affectus). When we hear a piece of good news, says Descartes, we feel 'spiritual joy' (this is the sort of pura cogitatio that, presumably, God and the angels experience). But when the news is grasped by the imagination, the 'animal spirits' flow from the brain to the heart muscles, which in turn transmit more 'movements' to the brain, with the result that we experience a feeling of 'laetitia animalis'.29 It is evident that Descartes is in a philosophical mess here. One might expect that joy would be regarded as a purely mental state and thus confined firmly to the realm of res cogitans. But here is Descartes distinguishing between the pure intellectual apprehension of joyful news, on the one hand, and, on the other, a feeling of joy. This latter is the bizarre entity called 'animal joy', which is somehow bound up with heart muscles and brain commotions. The choice of the phrase 'laetitia animalis' here is no accident. Descartes clearly wants to say that the joy of dogs and cats is analysable into just such physiological events. But what he seems to forget is that as a strict dualist he should not be using the word 'laetitia' at all in this case. For a true dualist, if something is 'laetitia' (an inescapably 'mental' predicate) it cannot be animalis (part of res extensa); and conversely, if it is animalis it cannot be laetitia.
The truth, perhaps, is that Descartes was never completely comfortable with strict dualism, however emphatically he affirmed it. As the contortions in the Sixth Meditation show, feelings or sensations (like those of hunger or thirst) are an insoluble worry for him. We do not merely 'notice' that we are in pain, as a pilot observes that his ship is damaged, we actually feel it; and this shows that there is a 
